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CHAPTER 9
GAS SALE CONTRACTS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE·
JAMES J. WHITE ..
Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
Ann Arbor, Michigan
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Introduction.

In the last decade, many oil and gas lawyers have learned more
than they wish to know about the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
• Perhaps an alternative title to this article should read: ·'Even Your Mother Will Breach When
the Contract Price Goes High Enough."
• • Professor White wishes to thank Joseph Boyle, Michigan Law School 1996. for his
assistance with the preparation of this manuscript.

(Mauhcw Bender & Co, Inc)
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Like it or not, Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs most contracts for the
sale of natural gas. Section 2-107(1) draws a distinct line between
leases, deeds, and other conveyances of minerals in place, on the one
hand, and the sale of the minerals by the miner or producer after the
minerals have been severed, on the other. It reads in full as follows:
( 1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like (including oil
and gas) . . . to be removed from realty is a contract for the sale
of goods within this Article if they are to be severed by the seller
but until severance a purported present sale thereof which is not
effective as a transfer of an interest in land is effective only as a
contract to sell.
The consequence of this rule is that Article 2 has little or nothing to
say about the sale of oil and gas rights from one owner to another
or about the form or interpretation of a lease to produce oil and gas, 1
but it has everything to say about a contract between a pipeline or
some other purchaser and the lessee or other producer who will drill
for and produce the gas.2
1 To the extent that a lease deals with the sale of a lessor's reserved oil or gas. it too might
be an Article 2 contract for sale of produced gas or oil that "belongs" to the royalty owner because
of his reserved right.
2 Dozens of appellate cases now recognize Article 2' s application to what are commonly called
"gas sale agreements." The Code applies equally to the sale of coal, nuclear fuel or oil, or to
any mineral that is to be mined or produced by the seller.
The cases have brought many of the sections of Article 2 to the interpretation of various
contracts. Among provisions of Article 2 the parties have attempted to invoke are at least the
following:
(I} 2-302 Unconscionability,
(2) 2-306 Output Requirements,
(3) 2-314 and 2-313 Implied and Express Warranties.
(4} 2-40 I Passing of Title,
(5) 2-105 and 2-106 Definitions, Sale of Goods,
(6) 2-615 Excuse,
(7) 2-701 to 2-713 Buyer's and Seller's Damages for Breach of Contracts for the _Sale of
Oil and Gas or the Like,
(8) 2-718 Liquidated Damages,
(9) 2-719 Contractual Agreements Concerning Remedies,
(10) 2-725 Statute of Limitations.
As one can see from this recitation, contracts for the sale of oil and gas have raised a
multiplicity of Article 2 issues. Most of those issues are not discussed in this article; many of
them are covered in the Practitioner's Edition of White and Summers, Uniform Commercial
Code (West Publishing Co. 4th ed. 1995).

(Matthew Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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The Problem.

Litigation over gas sale contracts has raged through state and federal
courts in Colorado, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, and other
gas producing states over the last ten years. 3 An observer of this
litigation might think it unique to gas sale contracts or at least to oil
and gas. That would be wrong. The problem at the root of most of
the litigation over gas sale contracts is well known and-like various
virulent strains of flu-periodically recurring.
The problem arises from a large deviation between the contract price
and the market price; a large enough deviation produces searing
economic pain, which in tum drives the buyer or the seller to do almost
anything to escape the contract. If there were no long-term contracts
or if the prices in these contracts tracked the market more or less, all
of the lawyers involved in this work and all of the professors writing
about it would have to find work elsewhere.
Consider some contract litigation history. I first encountered this
problem when I was engaged as a consultant for a firm that had made
long-term contracts to sell nuclear fuel to dozens of electric utilities. 4
3 For representative cases see Grynberg v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'r, 71 F.3d 413
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (whether ga, extracted from certain Colorado fields under a gas sale contract
was dedicated to interstate commerce); Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909
(I 0th Cir. I 993) (interpreting a Unit Operating agreement and a long-term take-or-pay natural
gas sale contract); Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MDU Resources Group, Inc., 988 F.2d 1529, 125
0. & G.R. l03 (8th Cir. 1993) (case remanded to determine damages in a long-term gas purchase
contract); Concise Oil & Gas Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 986 F.2d 1463, 126
0. & G.R. IO (5th Cir. 1993) (buyers breached a twenty-year gas sales contract with a take-or-pay
provision); Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 119 0. & G.R. 145
(10th Cir. 1991) (long-term contracts for sale and purchase of natural gas); W.A. Moncrief v.
Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 880 F. Supp. 1495, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 195 (D.
Wyo. 1995) (anticipatory breach and impracticability in long-term (twenty-year) gas purchase
contract).
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Chemco, Inc., 854 P.2d 1232, 123 0. & G.R. I (Colo. 1993)
(damages for breach of long-term take-or-pay contract); Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa
Operating Ltd. Partnership, 258 Kan. 226, 898 P.2d I 131 ( 1995) (defendant breached a long-term
natural gas contract with a fixed price); Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So.2d 166, 113
0. & G.R. 475 (La. 1992) (whether lessor was entitled to royalties on a take-or-pay contract
made to lessee by natural gas pipeline producer); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla,
Inc., 863 P.2d l 150, 126 0. & G.R. 99 (Okla. 1993) (breach of take-or-pay contract): Western
Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla. I 972) (seller successfully sued
buyer under ten-year natural gas purchase contract for breach of obligations implied in the
contract); Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co. of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463, 68 0. &
G.R. 131 (Wyo. 1980) (escalator clause in a long-term natural gas sales contract).
4 For cases arising out of the nuclear fuel crisis, see, e.g .. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied
General Nuclear Services, 731 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1990); TV A v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 570
(Mauhew Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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The company was originally run by a visionary who believed that
nuclear power was the future and who thought it important to establish
his company's position by offering favorable prices for large volumes
of nuclear fuel. Some of the contracts, written in the late I 960s or
early 1970s, obliged the seller to provide nuclear fuel at a slightly
escalated price for a term that might run twenty years from the opening
of a nuclear power plant-an event whose timing was itself uncertain.
Late in the I 970s, the price of nuclear fuel had risen to almost $40
per pound (it briefly went above $40) at a time when the consumer
price index (CPI) escalations of the very low prices in the sales
contracts called for the seller to receive around $7 to $10 per pound.
That price deviation condemned the CEO who succeeded the visionary
to spend his life renegotiating contracts. Ultimately the accident at
Three-Mile Island and the disassembling of the international cartel for
nuclear fuel (if there was one) solved the seller's long-range problem
when the price of nuclear fuel fell dramatically after 1979.
A concurrent but slightly different set of events caused considerable
disruption in the chemical industry early in the 1970s when President
Nixon imposed price controls. 5 Although the contracts for the sale
of chemicals were for shorter terms than those for minerals, the
differentials between price and value grew quickly in a pricecontrolled regime; not long after price controls were imposed, one saw
behavior of the kind we see now in the gas market. But in that case,
it was sellers who sought to avoid controlled contract prices so that
they could sell in uncontrolled markets abroad or otherwise dispose
of their goods in a transaction not covered by price controls.
When the market price of oil jumped dramatically in 1973 and 1974,
after the Arab oil embargo, utilities with fixed price requirements
F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Tenn. 1983): Florida Power and Light Co. v Wcstmghouse Corp (In the
Matter of Westinghouse Corp. Uram um Contracts Litigation). 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981 );
Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp .. 467 F Supp. I 29 (N.D. Iowa I 978): General
Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 420 F Supp 215 (W.D. NC. 1976), a/f"d, 553 F.2d 53 (10th
Cir. 1978); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Westinghouse Ell'.ctnc Corp., 69 FR D. 5. 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 945 (E.D. Tenn. 1975): United Nuclear Corp. v. Comhustion Engineering, Inc., 302
F. Supp. 539 (ED Pa. I 969).
5 Economic Stahilization Act of 1970, Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973. 15 U.S.C.
§ 751 et seq. Mandatory wage and price controls instituted in August 1971 remained in effect
for the chemical industry until January 1973. Phase Ill, which hegan in January 1973, called
for voluntary compliance with federal guidelines limiting average pnce increases to 1.5 percent.
For a discussion of some of the chemical companies' behavior under those controls, see White,
"Contract Law in Modem Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business
Life?" 22 Washburn L.J. l ( I 982)
(Manhcw Bender & Co . Inc )
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insisted that those contracts' requirements had enormously expanded,
and sellers sought to avoid long-term contracts to sell jet fuel to the
airlines. 6
Next came coal. Having learned that nuclear fuel was the past, and
suffering under the lash of the Clean Air Act, midwestern utilities
entered into contracts to purchase low sulphur coal that was to be
mined in the western states, particularly in Wyoming. In short order,
the escalated price in these contracts rose and stayed well above the
spot market for low sulphur coal. 7
Last is natural gas. 8 Its story is longer and more complicated.
Buyers' and sellers' difficulties here are not exclusively of their own
making. 9 To some extent they are an outgrowth of the change in
government regulation under which purchasers of natural gas at the
eastern end of the pipelines have been freed from their obligation by
federal fiat at a time when the pipelines did not receive parallel relief
from their western obligation to purchase. Moreover, many of the gas
purchase contracts were signed during shortage-shortage partly
induced by governmental price controls. The story is told about the
governor of Ohio who threatened a CEO of one of the pipelines with
jail if, during one of the nasty winters in the late 1970s, he did not
have enough gas to keep the schools and hospitals in Toledo and
Columbus open. One can imagine the kind of long-term contracts that
might result from that sort of threat.
Most of these economic events have a similar genesis and conclusion. Utilities (always) and pipelines (formerly) need long-term supply
and seek out long-term contracts. Because one side is more powerful
than the other, because the parties' vision of the future is too dim,
or because one or both draw the wrong inferences from recent events,
the price terms in these contracts eventually favor one party when the
contract price deviates radically from the market price.
6 For representative oil and oil product cases, see, e.g., Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co .. 8 I 3 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1987) (seller ceased shipment of oil): Orange & Rockland
Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 59 A.D.2d 110, 397 N.Y.S.2d 814, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv
310 (1977); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. I 975).
7 For representative coal cases see Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852
F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1988); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,
799 F.2d 265, 92 0. & G.R. 468 (7th Cir. 1986).
8 See the cases cited in N. 3 supra.
9 See generally Pierce, "Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts," 68 Va. L. Rev.
63 (1982).
(Mallhew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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When that happens, the buyer and seller behave in such a stereotypical way that one might think their behavior is programmed on their
genes.
First, the suffering party increases or decreases the quantity demanded or tendered. It might do that in the hope that the other party
will not notice or care; sometimes that is successful. Usually the other
does notice and insists on delivery of the contract quantity.
Second, the suffering party (buyer or seller) quibbles over the
performance of the other. For example, the utility who does not want
to buy coal is likely to maintain that the coal has too much sulphur
or that the coal delivered is different from the coal earlier produced
or from the sample that was provided. It may insist that this nonconforming coal cannot be burned in its furnaces.
Shortly after or simultaneously with the quibbling stage, the buyer
or the seller may modify the output or intake of various facilities for
reasons allegedly unrelated to the price. That party may justify the
changed performance under a force majeure clause or on other contract
terms.
Sooner or later during this phase, there may be an overt attempt
to renegotiate the contract.

If the renegotiation fails, one party sues.
Today we are probably at a late stage in these maneuvers in the
natural gas cycle. Many pipeline~ have seen their contract prices
escalate far above the market price. These buyers have already gone
through most of the steps described above. A great many gas supply
contracts have been renegotiated, many others have been the subject
of lawsuits, and many troublesome contracts must have expirect.1°
lO A current round of cases ("son of take-or-pay") involves the obligation of a producer whose
contract has been bought out to share the buyout proceeds with royalty owners. See, e.g., Diamond
Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159. 103 0. & G.R. 38 (5th Cir. 1988) (the
lessor/government was not entitled to take-or-pay payments; those payments made only on gas
actually produced and taken); Klein v. Arkoma Production Co., 73 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996)
(under Arkansas law, natural gas royalty owners and lessors were entitled to recover from natural
gas lessee's stockholders on unjust enrichment claim seeking royalty payments with respect to
take-or-pay claim payments by natural gas pipeline under gas purchase contract between pipeline
and lessee which were made as part of pipeline's purchase of lessee); Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
U.S. Dept. of Interior, 647 F. Supp. 1350, 103 0. & G.R. 27 (W.D. La. 1986) (no recovery,
the lease required "production" and the "pay" arose in an absence of production); Frey v. Amoco
Production Co., 603 So.2d 166, 113 0. & G.R. 475 (La. 1992) (lessors are entitled to their royalty
portion of the payments under the take-or-pay agreement).
(MJnhcw Bender & Co., Inc)
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The arguments of the pipelines and other buyers who are trying to
avoid the purchase of gas at high prices have taken many forms. First,
they have contended that the take-or-pay clauses are unenforceable
liquidated damage clauses. Second, they have argued that such clauses
are unconscionable. 11 Third, they have argued that they are freed from
the contract obligations because of partial impracticability, frustration
of purpose, or impossibility-all argued more or less under Section
2-615. 12 Fourth, they have urged common law doctrines such as
11 Courts have been quite hostile to defendants' unconscionability arguments, noting that Section 2-302 requires that the contract be found unconscionable "at the time of making the
contract," and finding that an increase in price is not normally a basis for unconscionability.
See Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 616, 97
0. & G.R. 7 (D. Colo. 1987) ("fanciful" to believe defendants could adduce evidence that a
clause that was repeated in numerous contracts over eighteen years by business executives was
unconscionable); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc .. 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1076 (10th Cir. 1983); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 33 U C.C. Rep.
Serv. 440, 75 0. & G.R. 413 (10th Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 989, 103 S. Ct. 344. 74 L.
Ed. 385 (1982). Should it not make a lawyer blush to stand before a court and argue that a
contract negotiated by gas pipeline executives (with the assistance of counsel) contained a clause
that was unconscionable at the time it was written' These are not cases where the parties can
show any procedural unconscionability. nor, at least as viewed at the time of contracting. is
there anything substantively unfair about them.
12 The ar.guments under 2-615 or analogous doctrines have been equally unavailing for
defendants. These cases are reminiscent of those arising out of the 01! shock in the 1970s. In
those cases, as here, the courts have been hostile to these claims that arise merely out of market
changes in the value of commodities. See Farnsworth, "Developments m Contract Law During
the 1980s: The Top Ten," 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 203, 214-215 (1990). In discussing the
take-or-pay litigation, Professor Farnsworth notes a "toughening judicial attitude toward excuse
based on changed circumstances" and a failure of the new spirit of contract expressed in
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) to win the
day. The courts applied the two prongs of Section 2-615-performance must be made
"impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made," and buyer did not assume a greater obligation
than usual-and also a judicially created third element that the occurrence must have been
unforeseeable. See Sabine Corp. v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d 83, I 07 0. & G.R. 292 (W.D. Okla. I 989); Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d
1209, 1220, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 605, 100 0. & G.R. 145, 169 (Okla. 1988) (Kauger, J.,
concurring). The court in Go/sen relied in part on Comment 4 to 2-6 IS which states:

Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the nse in cost is due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise
or collapse in the market itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk
which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.
Golsen, 756 P.2d at 1213, 100 0. & G.R. at 151-152. Courts have found the parties contemplated
"the likelihood of changing economic conditions, including alterations in fuel price levels "
Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., N. 11 supra. 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1043. S U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d 616, 97 0. & G.R. 7, 16 (D. Colo. 1987). See also Northern Indiana Pubhc Service
Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d I 505, 92 0 & G.R.
468 (7th Cir. 1986). The detailed price redetermination clauses present in most gas contracts
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc)
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mutual mistake 13 or that the enforcement of such a take-or-pay clause
would violate public policy. 14 Finally, various buyers have argued that
terms in their contracts (such as force majeure clauses) free them from
responsibility. 15
negated any argument that changes in prices upon deregulation were unforeseeable. The courts
refused to accept the buyer·s argument that the degree of the increase was unforeseeable. If
a party assumes a risk, it assumes the whole risk. It cannot later argue that the resulting situation
turned out worse than it had predicted when it accepted the risk. Sabine, supra, 725 F. Supp.
at 1174-78, 107 O.& G.R. at 319-327 (district court implied that a cost that is so excessive
and unreasonable so as to impose extreme financial hardship may qualify for impracticability,
but a price three times the spot price and two times the market value was not excessive enough).
One judge would allow an argument of impracticability in the take-or-pay context if the financial
health of the purchaser is threatened. See Golsen, supra, 756 P.2d at 1222, 100 0. & G.R. at
173 (Kauger, J. concurring). The frustration of purpose argument suffered a similar fate for the
same reasons. The purpose of the contract was to assure the seller a market for gas at a competitive
price and the buyer a long-term source of supply. This purpose was not frustrated by the take-orpay provision. Sabine, supra, 725 F. Supp. at 1178-79, 107 0. & G.R. at 328-331.
13 Courts also rejected defendants' arguments that the parties made a mutual mistake concerning the industry and the conditions under which the take-or-pay clause would operate. The
pipelines contended that the parties entered into the contracts with the expectation that pipelines
would continue to buy and resell gas in a market that was continually expanding. In re Columbia
Gas Transmission, No. 91-803, No. 91-804 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991 ); Memorandum of Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp. pursuant to Phase IIl(A)(c) of the Claims Estimation Schedule at 15
(Jan. 11, 1993). While it 1s true that the parties failed to predict gas surpluses and the disparity
that would arise between market prices and contract prices, the courts correctly note that
"[m]1staken predictions of future economic conditions .. will not facilitate relief from
contractual obligations." Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv.2d 616,970. & G.R. 7, 15 (D. Colo. 1987) (citations omitted); accord Sabine Corp.
v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1178-79, 107 0. & G.R. 292, 328-331 (W.D. Okla.
1989)
14 Defendants argued that the contracts were against public policy because they imposed unJUstifiable burdens on defendants, increased the price of gas to consumers, and contravened the
policy of the NGPA. These arguments likewise lacked merit. One court noted that the public
interest in holding parties to their contracts outweighs any interest in protecting defendants from
unwise contracts. Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1040, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv.2d 616, 97 0. & G.R. 7, 10 (D. Colo. 1987).
15 Courts have not been shy in holding that the buyer's inability to resell the gas at a profit
was not "in the contemplation of the law, a force majeure event." Golsen v. ONG Western,
Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1211-12, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 605, 608, 100 0. & G.R. 145, 150 (Okla.
1988); accord Sabine, 725 F. Supp. at I I 69, I 07 0. & G.R. at 310. Moreover, courts have ruled
that under the language of some of the clauses, even if the buyer was unable to take the gas
and resell it, no force majeure event prevented the buyer from complying with the pay option.
See Int'! Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 347, 86
0. & G.R. 556 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S. Ct. 1196, 89 L. Ed. 2d
310 ( 1986). Interestingly, the court found another clause in the contract did excuse the buyer.
A clause entitled "minimum bill" ;:;ovided that if the buyer is "unable to receive gas as provided
in the Contract for any reason beyond the reasonable control of the parties . . . an appropriate
adjustment in the minimum purchase requirement . . . shall be made." The buyer in this case
was a user of natural gas, and the pipeline, the seller. The buyer's inability to purchase the
minimum quantity stemmed not from pricing problems but from its attempts to comply with
(MJLthcw Bender & Co . Inc)
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For the most part, these arguments have failed, but in individual
cases they may have gained a strategic advantage for an occasional
buyer. Most of these arguments have been constructed in one way or
another on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Tum now to
a novel attempt to use Section 2-306 of Article 2 to escape an
obligation to purchase gas under a conventional gas sale contract.
§

9.03.

Section 2-306 Applied to Gas Sale Contracts.

One of the most clever and imaginative responses of a gas buyer
confronted with too much gas at too high a price occurred in Lenape
Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. 16 In that case the
pipeline signed an agreement in 1979 to purchase gas for twenty years
from a particular tract in Texas. Tennessee Gas agreed to buy 85
percent of the seller's deliverable capacity. The contract had the usual
take-or-pay terms. When, after ten years of modest production, the
sellers drilled a hugely successful well and threatened to tender gas
that exceeded any prior year's gas quantity by more than I 00 times,
Tennessee Gas sought declaratory relief. A principal defense against
taking the full quantity rested on Section 2-306's limits on increase
of quantities tendered under output contracts. At trial the producer won
a summary finding that the contract was not an output contract. The
Court of Appeals reversed. In its first opinion (August I, 1995, Lenape
new air pollutton rcqum·111cnts. The buyer switched from an energy-intensive combustion
evaporator to a cleaner, saltrng-out process. The court found that the buyer had no suitable way
to comply with the air regulations without shutting down its combustion units. The court rejected
seller's argument that huycr should he denied its defense because ti complied with air pollution
controls earlicr than mandated The court stated that as a matter of law, governmental policy
need not be expltcitly mandatory to cause impracticability. See also Golsen v. ONG Western,
Inc., 756 P.2d at 12 I 4, I 00 0. & G R. at I 55-16 I (holding that conservation laws did not prevent
producers from paying for gas not tendered) Two courts rejected the force 11w1eare arguments
because the ptpcltnes fa tied to give proper notice in accordance with the clause. Resource;, Inv.
Corp., supra, 669 F Supp at I 043-.+4. 97 0. & G.R at 16; Supenor Oil Co. v Transco Energy
Co., 616 F. Supp. 98, 88 0. & GR. 83 (W.D. La. 1985) (Lomsiana law)
For an addtttonal wrinkle, see Universal Resources Corp. v Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co ..
813 F.2d 77, 3 U C.C Rep Serv.2d 988,960. & GR 419 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied. 821
F.2d 1097, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 490, 101 0. & G.R. 390 (5th Cir 1987) In that case, the
buyer argued that 11 was Justified in refusing to make payments or take the gas because its seller
failed to give adequate assurance under Section 2-609 that the seller would have sufficient gas
to fulfill its gas deltvery obltgations m the future. The court re.1ected that argument by findrng
there was no event occurring "after" the execution of the agreement that would give nse to
insecurity. Doubtless the court was correct. It seems likely that the insecurity argument was oRe
thought up by the lawyers, not by the business person.
l6 1995 WL 453266, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d I (Tex. 1995), rev 'd 011 reh 'g, 1996 WL 185352
(Tex. 1996)
(Mauhcw Bender & Co, lnc.)
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[) the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals; in its
second opinion (April 18, 1996, Lenape I[) the Supreme Court
reversed. The trial court found the gas purchase contract was not an
output contract. The Court of Appeals disagreed; it found that the gas
purchase contract was an output contract under the U.C.C. The Texas
Supreme Court found first that the contract was an output contract,
and second that it was not.
Between the first and second Supreme Court decisions, two members left the Supreme Court, and two new ones, Justices Baker and
Abbott, joined it. The newcomers joined Justices Enoch and Comyn
of the old minority, and Justice Spector of the majority in Lenape I
switched sides. The switch of Justice Spector and the addition of the
two newcomers turned Lenape l's minority into Lenape /l's majority.
That relegated four who were part of the six person majority in Lenape
/ (Phillips, Gonzalez, Hecht, and Owen) to minority status. At this
writing, gas sale contracts are not output contracts in Texas and are
therefore not governed by Section 2-306 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Of course, Tennessee Gas's bottom line, which will never be
reached unless there is retrial, is that it is freed from taking certain
of the increase that occurred after I 989 because under Section 2-306
that increase was either "not in good faith" or was a quantity
"unreasonably disproportionate . . . to any normal or otherwise
comparable prior output . . .. " 17 While other courts have labeled
gas sale contracts and the like as output contracts, 18 Lenape is the
first case in which the parties and the court have focused on the
implications of that conclusion.
Lenape is a hard case that threatens to make bad law. Sellers of
gas may reasonably expect a buyer to take any quantity, however large,
17 Tennessee Gas asserted that its purchases from the tract had never been more than $300,000
per year over twelve years, but that it would have been required to pay more than $89 million
in 1993.
18 For other cases holding or suggesting that gas purchase contracts are output or requirement
contracts, see United States v. Great Plains Gasification Assoc., 819 F.2d 831, 834, 94 0. &
G.R. 534, 539 (8th Cir. 1987) (pipelines had agreed to take or pay a fixed share of gas, and
the court found the contract language to require the pipelines to purchase the entire output);
American Exploration Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 311, 89 0. &
G.R. 598, 601 (6th Cir. 1985) (The ~ourt denied seller's preliminary injunction to prevent buyer
from purchasing only 25 percent of gas produced under a long-term take-or-pay contract. The
contract categorized the agreement as a fixed price output contract); Southwest Natural Gas Co.
v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630, 632-633 (10th Cir. 1939) (fifteen-year
agreement for the supply of defendant's requirements).
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc)
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that is produced from a fixed tract. If that is so, there is no quantity
that is "unreasonably disproportionate" to earlier quantities or could
be tendered in "bad faith," and the buyer should be made to take every
cubic foot of gas that comes off the property. Regrettably, that
conclusion does not keep the contract from being an output contract;
it merely means that under the practice of the oil and gas industry,
the buyer may be obliged to swallow the full amount even when it
is grossly larger than the output in prior years. When the Supreme
Court in Lenape II concluded that Tennessee Gas had to take the entire
output by finding that gas sale contracts are not output contracts, it
might have reached the right conclusion, but it did so for the wrong
reason.
[1]

Output Contract?

Under Section 2-306, "a term which measures the quantity by the
output of the seller . . . means such actual output . . . as may occur
. . .. " The gas purchase contract in Lenape required the buyer to
take or pay for "a quantity of gas equal to 85 percent of seller's
delivery capacity." The court's conclusion means that "delivery
capacity" is not a synonym for "output." That conclusion is hard to
swallow.

In Lenape II the majority suggests first that this is not an output
contract, and second that even if gas contracts are output contracts,
this particular contract is not one because the parties have agreed to
a specific quantity.
First, the court suggested that this was not an output contract
because the buyer did not have to buy any production, but could "pay"
in lieu. That might be so, but the quantity term-what Section 2-306
defines-is the same whether the buyer's performance is to take the
gas or to pay for it. The function of the output term is to fix the quantity
for which the buyer is responsible, not to determine whether the buyer
has an option of taking the gas or paying for it and taking it later.
Finding that the "or pay" term of the take-or-pay clause keeps this
from being an output contract is misreading the purpose of Section
2-306.
Second, the court suggested this was not an output contract because
the "laws of physics" affect the producer's ability to produce gas. Of
course, the laws of physics control every output contract. Assume a
seller who agrees to sell the entire output of its cement plant. That
(Mauhew Bender & Co , Inc.)
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output is determined by the physical dimensions of its plant, the ability
of its work force, and availability of raw materials-all governed by
the "laws of physics."
Third, the court noted that a contract for a fixed quantity is not an
output contract and that Section 2-306 is a gap filler for cases where
there is no agreed specific quantity. That is true, but in what sense
does "85 percent of Lenape' s delivery capacity" set a specific quantity? To find that "delivery capacity" states a "specific quantity," one
must conclude that the words "delivery capacity" have a different
meaning from "output."
A careful comparison of Justice Enoch's majority opinion in Lenape
/I with his minority opinion in Lenape I suggests that even he might

be less certain than first appears. The paragraph in Lenape that sets
out the "set quantity" argument starts with the sentence: 'The GPA
requires Tennessee to purchase a set quantity of gas produced from
the committed reserves . . .. " That same paragraph appears in Justice
Enoch's dissent in Lenape I, but there the first sentence in the
paragraph reads as follows:
If the GPA provided that Tennessee was required to purchase all
the natural gas Lenape produced, then arguably, it would be an
output contract.
The omission of the quoted sentence from the second writing suggests
to the author that Justice Enoch has since realized how damning is
his admission in that sentence. Surely, there is no logic to the
conclusion that 100 percent of "capacity" is an output contract, but
that 85 percent of "capacity" is not. Presumably aware of that
inconsistency, Justice Enoch has removed the sentence from his
opinion in Lenape II, yet its presence in Lenape I suggests that Justice
Enoch is less confident of his "specific quantity" argument than his
new opinion reveals.1 9
19 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d I at 17 (Tex. 1995)

I( !he GPA provided Iha/ Tennessee was required IO purchase all the nlllural gas Lenape
produced, !hen arguably, it would be an output conm1ct. But it does not. The GPA requires
Tennessee to purchase a set quantity of gas defined as 85 percent of Lenape's delivery
capacity. Lenape's delivery capacity is a readily ascertamablc quantity, measured as often
as once every three months through a delivery capacity test. The specific quantity of natural
gas for which Tennessee must take or pay is a simple mathematical calculation: .85 multiplied
by Seller's delivery capacity. (emphasis added)
Compare 1996 WL 185352 at 5:
The GPA requires Tennessee to purchase a set quantity of gas produced from the committed
{Mallhcw Bender & Co, Inc)
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Note, too, that the majority's argument is not helped by the fact
that there is a fixed quantity of gas in the reservoir, which, by
hypothesis, would set the absolute ceiling on the amount of gas that
could be produced under the contract. While the ceiling in most output
contracts would not be formed by the quantity of a mineral in place,
other physical limitations such as maximum plant output, available
raw materials, and the like place comparable physical, practical, and
economic ceilings on all output contracts.
The majority in Lenape II is on sounder ground when it speaks of
the expectations of parties to gas sale contracts and suggests some
of the reasons why a diligent lessee might feel obliged to drill
additional wells to fulfill its responsibility to its lessors. Unfortunately,
these arguments do not go to the question whether this is an output
contract, but to the questions of good faith and reasonable proportion.
And is it the Supreme Court's job to rewrite Section 2-306? These
are questions that might concern the legislature should it be called
on to amend Section 2-306 to exclude gas sale contracts, but the
parties' expectations about output do not seem relevant to the question
whether a particular agreement is an output contract under existing
law.
How should the court have decided Lenape? In the author's view,
this is an output contract, and it is subject to Section 2-306. Thus,
the court should have found the contract to be for 85 percent of the
tract's output governed by Section 2-306 and should have concentrated its attention on the "good faith" and "unreasonably disproportionate" limits. A buyer is obliged to purchase all of the output that
is tendered in good faith as long as it is not "unreasonably disproportionate" to any "normal" or "otherwise comparable prior output." In
the author's opinion, the majority in Lenape I was too generous to
buyers by its coy suggestion that the size of the increase in output
might render it in bad faith or unreasonably disproportionate. As a
dissenter in Lenape II, Chief Justice Phillips writes a more persuasive
opinion on these issues than he did as the leader of the majority in
Lenape I.
reserves defined as 85 percent of Lenape's delivery capacity. Lenape's delivery capacity is
a readily ascertainable quantity, measured as often as once every three months through a
delivery capacity test. The specific quantity of natural gas for which Tennessee must take
or pay is the simple mathematical calculation: .85 multiplied by Sellers' delivery capacity.
Section 2.306 does not apply to fill in the quantity-good faith tender-because the quantity
is specified as a determinable amount, Seller's delivery capacity.
(Mauhcw Bender & Co., Inc.)
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Good Faith and Unreasonably Disproportionate.

Tum now to "good faith" and "unreasonably disproportionate." The
Lenape I majority and Lenape II dissent conclude that good faith and
reasonable proportion are separate conditions, not synonyms. This
statutory interpretation is impeccable, but the practical distinctions
between the two ideas may be so indistinct that a trial judge or jury
will have difficulty discerning them. In any case, the seller is permitted
variations provided they are done "in good faith," but in no case may
they be "unreasonably disproportionate."

[a]

Good Faith.

But how does one breathe life into these concepts? Much flatulent
nonsense has been written about "good faith." 20 One of Karl Llewellyn's dirtiest tricks· was his facile suggestion that good faith could
readily be distinguished from bad. 21 In fact, in a room of 100 lawyers
and judges, there will be 98 separate definitions of good faith.
The generally applicable definition of good faith is "honesty in fact."
Since gas producers are merchants under Article 2, they are subject
to a more stringent definition of good faith under Section 2-l03(1)(b),
namely, "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." Presumably this means that the
seller can be at least as unfair as the trade will permit, but no more
so. If most producers would have drilled the Lenape well and tendered
the enlarged output from the contracted property, then this seller acts
in good faith when it does the same.
With ninety or more millions of dollars at stake per year, each side
in Lenape would have been able to find an expert to espouse its
conclusion about the hypothetical behavior of most producers or
otherwise about standards in the trade. Because each party in a case
like Lenape will find persuasive experts that espouse its own view
20 Not including Summers, '"Good Faith' in General Contract Law and Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code," 54 Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968); "General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization," 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982).
21 The New York Law Revision Commission was also skeptical:

Application of [the reasonable commercial standard part of the good faith definition] . . .
is exceedingly difficult, since applicable "commercial standards," even if in existence, would
be difficult to ascertain and prove.
Report of the Law Review Commission of 1955, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, Vol.
I, at 377.
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing," expert opinion
will not be a reliable guide for a trial judge.
Perhaps one party can find volume eruptions similar to the one in
Lenape in other fields and then prove parties' responses to those
eruptions. If enough data can be dug out of similar transactions, those
data could define the standards of the trade. Of course, trade practice
is not easily built from such data. Every case is different in important
and unimportant ways-the contract, the past performance, the magnitude of the volume increase, and most of all, the relationship between
the contract price and the market price. Worse yet, these data on
practice must be captured from private transactions and from parties
who have little interest in publicity and much interest in secrecy.
A trial judge in a case like Lenape, who must make a finding on
good faith and justify that finding, is not in an enviable position. The
clarity of the legal rule is beguiling (to find and apply "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"). The difficulty of
applying that standard to particular facts in the face of contradictory
expert testimony and meager data on trade behavior is the grim reality.

[b]

Unreasonably Disproportionate.

Finding bad or good faith is child's play compared with defining
"unreasonably disproportionate." How does this concept compare to
lack of good faith? The majority in Lenape I was quite coy here. It
cites and quotes from several cases, but ultimately leaves one uncertain
about how one might define the term. 2 2
2 2 The Court in Lenape I discusses the issue as follows:

If the determining party seeks to increase quantity, however, most courts also require that
those increases not be unreasonably disproportionate to stated estimates or, if no stated
estimates exist, to prior output. See, e.g., Empire Gas Co. v. American Bakeries Co., 840
F.2d 1333, 1337-38, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "unreasonably
disproportionate" should not be read literally when buyer in a requirements contract is
demanding less, rather than more of stated estimate); see also Angelica Uniform Group, Inc.
v. Ponderosa Systems, Inc., 636 F.2d 232, 232, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 460 (8th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); R.A. Weaver and Assoc., Inc. v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1322,
25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 388 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

* * *
Giving effect to every word of the statute, we read § 2.306 as requiring that the tendering
of goods in an output contract (I) be not unreasonably disproportionate to any normal or
otherwise compar.able prior output or stated estimates, and (2) be in good faith. Therefore,
in the absence of stated contract estimates, if a quantity is tendered that a trier of fact
determines to be unreasonably disproportionate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior
output, a trier of fact could find that the tendering violates § 2.306 regardless of a determination
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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Consider first what is not unreasonably disproportionate. The
comments to Section 2-306 contemplate substantial, even dramatic
increases or decreases. For example, Comment 1 says: "A shutdown
by a requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permissible
. . . . " Thus the test is not merely a mathematical comparison of
the output before and after. Those two numbers can deviate wildly
from one another and still not be unreasonably disproportionate.
The comments to Section 2-306 hint that the seller's motivation
in expanding output might be the key to distinguishing between radical
increases that are acceptable and those that are not. They note that
closing a plant for "lack of orders" might be different from closing
to "curtail losses." Presumably, "curtailing losses" means refusing to
of good faith. Since flexibility is the driving force behind open quantity contracts. this
disproportionality standard should be applied only in cases in which the disputed output was
abnonnal or beyond the expectation of the parties. As a separate matter, a court may undertake
a general good faith analysis such as whether a party had a valid business reason for the
increase or whether the party sought to exploit a contract term.
The court of appeals held that the disproportionality standard of§ 2.306 "prohibits a sudden
increase over a short period of time, if that increase is unreasonable." 870 S.W.2d at 294
n.6. It is not the suddenness of the increase, however, that violates § 2.306. The question
is whether the increase greatly exceeds nonnal output or any comparable prior output. Sellers
argue that prior output cannot set a standard for an agreement because it is often, as it was
in this case, very small. However, twelve years of consistent output may suffice to establish
a baseline of expectations and prior output against which future output can be compared for
purposes of detennining whether the future output is unreasonably disproportionate. In this
case Tennessee claims that production under the GPA has increased more than 100 times.
Tennessee is entitled to prove that this is not nonnal or expected.
In undertaking an investigation of good faith in an open quantity contract, the words of
Professor Weistart are fitting:
[A] legitimate purpose of the law of commercial transactions is to temper one party's
attempt to secure his greatest advantage with concern for the potential impact upon the
party from whom performance can be exacted. If unbridled expectations are likely to
produce considerable economic hardship for one party, the stability of commercial
transactions is promoted by a limitation upon the effect of a potentially oppressive contract
tenn.
Weistart, "Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the U.C.C.," Duke
L.J. 599, 615 (1973).
Lenape, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d at 12-14. The Court passes the issue back to the trial court
as follows:
As § 2.306 applies, and as the evidence raises an issue whether there may have been a violation
of its provisions in this case, the court of appeals correctly reversed the summary judgment
for the Sellers on this issue.
Lenape, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d at 16.
(Matthew Bender & Co , Inc.)
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perform because the marginal cost of performance 23 exceeds the
contract price for that performance and is different from losses
resulting from absence of orders. If that is what the comment means,
it is resting on the unarticulated premise that the seller has implicitly
agreed to produce even if its marginal costs rise above the contract
price but has not agreed to absorb losses arising because there are too
few units of production. But the two cases probably come to the same
thing. As orders decrease, the marginal cost of producing the remaining units rises, and so the second ca~e (absence of orders) becomes
the first (curtailing losses). 24 Almost certainly the quoted comment
comes straight from the pen of the intuitive, fearless, and foolish
Llewellyn-inferring intention and agreement from bar stool empirical
research or worse.
There is a somewhat more helpful hint-at least about Professor
Llewellyn's ruminations-later in the same comment: "One of the
factors in an expansion situation would be whether the market price
had risen greatly in a case in which the requirements contract contained
a fixed price .. , This hints that the output seller or requirements buyer
should not take too much of an advantage of a price shift in its favor.
Note the qualification: The rule applies only when there is a "great"
rise, and the rise is only "one factor in determining whether the
increase is permitted." But where does this idea come from? Who says
it is unexpected and therefore unfair to sock it to the other party when
the market turns? Only if these comments have some basis other than
Professor Llewellyn's fantasies about trade reasonableness and morality should they carry any weight. They state Professor Llewellyn's
view on opportunistic behavior, on what behavior is moral and what
immoral. He could have been wrong; surely his judgment about
parties' morality cannot apply to every output case.
Apart from acknowledging the possibility that large deviations
might be permissible, the comments give little help. Like a streetcar
on a circular route, they drop one off at the beginning of the route:
Permissible change in output is governed by what the parties actually
intended or what they would have intended had they thought about
it.
So how does a court find the parties' intention? Unless one adopts
the Lenape II majority view that a gas contract for 85 percent of a
23 Or is it fully allocated costs?

24 Or is reduct1011 of output Justified only because the seller"s cash flow will not support
production '1
(Matthew Bender & Co , Inc.)
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tract's deliverables is not an output contract, no contract term will
reveal the parties' intention. There will be no maximum or minimum
quantity and no reliable recollection of a negotiator. Because these
are long-term contracts that are likely to have been signed years before
any dispute, and because, by hypothesis, our increase in output is
grandly dramatic, beyond the buyer's and seller's dreams, there will
be no reliable testimony even about the contract negotiators' unexpressed intentions.
In rare cases, circumstance may give a clue about the parties'
intentions. If, for example, the buyer was not a pipeline who intended
to resell but a user such as an industrial plant or a school district, the
parties' expectations may be different. Surely no consumer buyer
intends to take grossly more gas than it can consume. But circumstances that inform a court's judgment are likely to be few and far
between.
If there is no evidence of actual intention, we come finally to a

hypothetical construct-what the parties would have intended if they
had thought about it. Here the definition of reasonable proportion
becomes indistinguishable from the definition of good faith. Here the
court will be made to listen to the same opposing experts who will
testify about good faith. What the parties "would have intended" is
almost certainly what "people in the trade would have regarded as
okay." Thus, "in good faith" equals "not unreasonably disproportionate."

[c]

Models.

Another way to search for hypothetical intention is to classify the
parties' relationship-to adopt a bargaining model-and to infer
expected (and therefore fair, moral, and not opportunistic) behavior
from that relationship. Professor Gergen has argued that output and
requirements contracts are joint ventures. 25 In a joint venture, Professor Gergen argues, the parties would engage only in behavior that
produces a joint gain-not that each must gain from every transaction
but that one party's gain must always exceed the other's loss. In
Lenape this would mean that the difference between the producer's
cost and the contract price (the producer's gain) must exceed the
difference between the contract price and the pipeline's resale price
25 Gergen, "The Use of Open Tenns in Contract," 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997 (1992).
(Matthew Bender & Co • Inc.)
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(the pipeline's loss). There will be a joint gain whenever the buyer's
resale price (usually market price) exceeds the producer's cost.
In his amicus brief filed in Lenape, Professor Gergen offered a more
conservative version of this argument. In that brief, Professor Gergen
argued that all increases in output which the producer would have
undertaken had the contract price equalled the market price (in good
faith and not unreasonably disproportionate) are permitted. That is to
say that any output that would have occurred without regard to the
high contract price is acceptable.
This argument builds on the comments to Section 2-306, which
suggest that one cannot take too much advantage of a price shift in
one's favor. Professor Gergen hypothesizes that a joint venturer is not
taking too much advantage if he is doing only what he would have
done with the contract rewritten so that the contract price is the market
pnce.
Professor Gergen is probably right, but perhaps too conservative.
One might regard the producer and the pipeline not as fully cooperative
joint venturers, but as cooperative antagonists. 26 What does one expect
from a cooperative antagonist? Can one expect the other to limit his
output to a level that produces joint gains? I doubt it. The unarticulated
intention of the cooperative antagonists might be stated as follows:
"When the price favors me, I intend to do everything I can to increase
output without regard to the market price at which you must resell." 27
Indeed, we have the recent example of the Columbia Gas case. 28
Columbia Gas had to take bankruptcy to avoid its gas purchase
obligations. Presumably it attempted to renegotiate most of its contracts before it resorted to Chapter 11, but could not escape a sufficient
26 Professor Howard Raiffa in The Art and Science of Negotiation (Harvard University Press
I 982), classifies negotiating opponents as fully cooperative partners, cooperative antagonists,
and bitterly opposed antagonists. Doubtless most business transactions fall within the regime
of cooperative antagonists. Professor Raiffa emphasizes that it is difficult to infer actual or
presumed intentions without first characterizing the relationship. Yet different business people
in similar circumstances may have quite different expectations about what should happen on
the occurrence of cucumstances that have not been considered m their negotiations.
27 Professor Gergen argues that the comments foreclose "opportunistic" behavior by one of
the parties. Opportunistic in this context means "with little or no regard for moral principles,"
i.e., what is fair in the context is not opportunistic and what is unfair is opportunistic. Fairness
(morality) between free parties of relatively equal bargaining power should be defined by their
explicit or implicit agreement. If each explicitly or implicitly agrees to sock it to the other side
when the market turns in his favor, that behavior is neither immoral nor opportunistic.
28 In re Columbia Gas System, Inc., No. 91-803, No. 91-804 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
(Mallhew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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number of its contracts to avoid bankruptcy. Columbia Gas's experience suggests that the implicit understanding of sellers of gas is not
just to be good joint venturers, but to press their contract advantage
well beyond what would be fair if the other party were a joint venturer.
Surely Professor Gergen is right; there is nothing immoral (and so
nothing "unreasonable" or deviant from "standards of fairness") in
producing as much as would have been produced under a contract with
a price equal to the market price. If one transported the pipeline back
to the signing and asked whether it expected the seller to produce at
least as much as under a regime where contract price was higher than
market price as it would have produced at market price, the pipeline
would have to admit to that expectation.
A cooperative antagonist might have to recognize even larger
outputs as morally permissible (and so not "unreasonable" or deviant
from "standards of fairness"). Assume that one could read the minds
of two cooperative antagonists who are negotiating a gas sale contract.
Assume that the seller's private intentions are as follows: "I intend
to maximize my output under this contract when the contract price
rises, and I intend to do that even to your ruination." Assume that
the pipeline's private intention is as follows: "If the market price
moves above the contract price on this contract, I intend to use every
means possible to force you to deliver every last BTU of gas on that
tract-even though you might have to sell it to me for $ I per million
btu when the market price is $10 per million btu." If those are or would
have been the intentions of the parties, and if, as players in the trade,
each did or should have recognized the other's unarticulated intention,
there is nothing opportunistic or otherwise immoral in tendering or
demanding even gigantic additional quantities. If the tender of such
an increased output conforms to the expectations of persons in the
trade, it is in "good faith" and, since conforming to actual or
hypothetical expectations, not "unreasonably disproportionate."
If one accepts t!1e hypothesis that most cooperative antagonists
would expand output without limit whenever the contract price
exceeds production cost enough to make it profitable for the seller,
the conclusion that gas sale contracts are output contracts would be
a tempest in a teapot. In fact, Chief Justice Phillips puts forward a
much more sophisticated argument on this ground in his dissent in
lenape I I than he did as the leader of the majority in le nape I. As
a dissenter in lenape II, he emphasizes some of the points made above
(Mauhcw Bender & Co., Inc )
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concerning the wide deviations in output that might be acceptable and
expected within good faith and without being unreasonably
disproportionate:
The parties' expectations should also be considered in light of
the general nature of the industry. The possibility of greatly
increased output, and the awareness of that possibility, is an
essential characteristic of the oil and gas industry, which provides
the context in which the GPA must be considered. Texas courts have
long recognized that the existence of oil or gas in a particular tract
of land and "the amount of [a well's] output" is highly speculative.

* * *
Moreover, these sophisticated parties obviously were aware of
Len ape's duty as lessee to reasonably develop the leases underlying
the GPA, * * * and Lenape's duty as an operator to protect the
leasehold from drainage, which could give rise to a duty to drill
an offset well under certain circumstances. * * * Especially in light
of Lenape's duties under the underlying leases, Tennessee's reasonable expectations had to encompass the possibility that at any time
during the twenty-year term, new and productive wells might be
drilled. Likewise, the parties' reasonable expectations would have
encompassed reasonable industry practices relating to the production and sale of gas. On remand, the parties would have the
opportunity to put forward all such relevant evidence concerning
the nature of the industry as it impacts the parties' reasonable
expectations at the time the GP A was entered into. 29
Even if Chief Justice Phillips' dissent in Lenape /I were the majority
opinion, Tennessee Gas could not take much solace. The quoted
discussion of good faith and unreasonable disproportion tells a trial
court that gas buyers are obliged to take output, even in radically
varying amounts, for that is the parties' expectation. When a buyer
agrees to take all of the deliverables from a particular tract on which
no drilling has yet taken place, it is risking the possibility that a large
volume of gas will be tendered; presumably, the buyer knows that.
Both buyers and sellers also know of things that can be done to rework
wells and to stimulate production over the long or short term.
Production so enlarged is to be expected, and is, in most cases, not
29 Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline. 1996 WL 185352, at 18-19 (Tex.
1996).
(Matthew Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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unreasonably disproportionate or tendered in bad faith. Being quite
ignorant of the gas industry, the author would make at least a small
bet that even trial courts who are told that gas sales contracts are output
contracts would be slow to let buyers out of contracts because of
increased supply. If the hypotheses stated above about human nature
and the expectations of the parties and of the trade are true, requiring
buyers to take the full output will usually be the right outcome.
§

9.04.

Drafting Contract Palliatives.

Unless one has enough market power to impose all of his own terms
on the other party, there is no perfect drafting solution to the problems
inherent in long-term contracts. There are, however, a series of
palliatives that may minimize the risk that the price will deviate so
far above or below the market that one party will be compelled to
break out of the contract.
From the point of view of an unfettered buyer, the drafting solution
to the buyer's problem in Lenape is simple. The buyer can state a
maximum amount of gas it is obliged to take in any year under the
contract. If this volume is low enough, it will minimize the economic
pain caused by even radical deviation between contract price and
market price. The unfettered buyer could also solve the problem by
insisting on a market or submarket price. 3o
If one looks beyond gas sale contracts in which contract price
exceeds the market to cases where the reverse is true (the market goes
far above the contract price) or where there are market deviations
favoring either the buyer or seller in long-term contracts for the sale
of other commodities and where the buyers and sellers have equal
power, the solutions are not so obvious. The drafter of any long-term
contract should start with the proposition that his client wishes to be
protected against any contract with a large economic cost. At least
three terms in every contract directly affect the potential economic
cost-price, term, and quantity. If the price tracks the market, term
30 If one has unfettered power, he can draft a contract tenn that will almost certainly protect
his client's interest. For example, one sees ratchet provisions in the contracts negotiated in the
1970s. Like a ratchet, the prices in these contracts go only one way, upward. Thus, a contract
that never declines, but always increases 2 percent per quarter will guarantee a contract price
above the market price any time the market rises at less than 8 percent per year compounded.
By the same token, prices tied to the CPI or similar indices almost never decline. (Do you
remember a decline in the CP[?) They may not rise enough, but they do rise inexorably, and
during a long-term contract are almost certain to rise substantially.
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc)
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and quantity are probably irrelevant, for by hypothesis, the seller
receives about what he would have received elsewhere, and the
buyer--even a buyer who must take more than he wishes--can resell
on the market at little or no loss.

If the contract is for a term of one year as opposed to twenty or
fo;ty years, the economic cost of a price that deviates radically from
the market, is limited to one year's loss. Also the likelihood of a radical
deviation in only one year is quite small. Similarly, economic exposure
can be limited by limiting the quantity that is to be bought or sold.
Many contracts by gas producers, pipelines, miners, and utilities
seem to start with a given that there will be an extended term and
a volume limited only by "output" or "requirements." A good lawyer
should not take these provisions as given, but should insist that the
client examine the quantity and term to be certain that the traditional
ideas on quantity and term make sense in the particular case.
Assuming that the client insists on unlimited quantities and a long
term, the drafter is left with only the price as a means of protecting
the client. But how to adjust the contract price? Forms of escalator
clauses are as numerous and varied as man's imagination. Regrettably,
unsuccessful escalation clauses are almost as numerous. The drafter
should first do a self-examination. Am I drafting this clause to solve
only the most recent problem (e.g., a decline in market prices for gas)?
Should I also consider the opposite possibility, namely that gas prices
will rise radically-and, if that is a possibility, how do I account for
that? This little step is critical. It has been the author's observation
that lawyers and other drafters are subject to an immutable egotistical
rule that governs everyone: We are disproportionately influenced by
events that have recently occurred to us. Thus, contracts written while
market prices are soaring above contract prices include aggressive and
effective escalators; contracts written when market prices are falling
or contract prices are rising include careful protections against further
declines in market price. Like armies that are condemned to fight
battles of the previous war, lawyers and business people seem
condemned to solve the price problem of the present and recent past,
but to deal not at all with the price problem of the future.
The Columbia Gas Pipeline had approximately 4,500 gas contracts
when it went into bankruptcy. It exercised its rights under Section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code to cancel those contracts. The contracts must
have included almost every price escalation term known to man. Some
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc )
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had fixed escalators (the price will increase 2 percent per quarter);
others had most favored nation clauses (you must pay me no less than
you are paying others). Some were escalated according to the CPI,
the gross domestic product (GDP), or other indices. A few had
renegotiation provisions. There were different difficulties with each
of these escalator terms, but most shared one fault: They caused the
contract price to rise while the spot price stood still or declined.
Usually it is not the relationship between a seller's costs and the
contract price that makes a contract seem onerous; it is the relationship
between the market price and the contract price. Thus, sellers of oil
who must sell at $2 per barrel when the spot market is at $16 will
be unhappy even though the oil was produced from an old field at
a cost of $.25 per barrel. By the same token, a utility that has the
right to pass the entire cost of its fuel through to its customers will
still be unhappy when it has to pay $15 per ton under its contract for
coal that it could buy on the market for $5 per ton.
Whether rational or not, a party's satisfaction seems to depend
mostly on the extent to which the contract price tracks spot or other
alternative market price. The safest price for the contract negotiator
is probably one tied in some way to the most likely alternative market
price such as a spot market-perhaps with an appropriate premium
on or discount from that price. Only rarely can a clever negotiator
take advantage of a slower competitor by setting a price that will
ratchet in favor of his own client. If the person on the other side of
the table is one's equal in intelligence and market power, the party
who uses an escalator not tied to a market price should realize that
he is making a large bet on events that may be as unpredictable as
the name of the horse who will win the Kentucky Derby four years
from now.
§

9.05.

Damages for Breach of Long-Term Contracts for Sale
of Gas, Oil and Other Commodities. 3 1

The most prevalent sales contract is for delivery of a fixed quantity
of goods at a fixed price in one or more installments-the sale of one
or of 100 copying machines. The term might be one month or a few
months; in rare cases it might be longer than a year but almost never
31 Section 9.05 is reprinted from Section 6-8 of White & Summers, I Uniform Commercial
Code 347-354 (West 4th ed. 1995) with permission of the West Publishing Corporation.
(Matthew Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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longer than five years. Calculating damages upon breach of such a
contract is straightforward.
The givens in a short-term contract--quantity and price-will be
in serious dispute in the long-term contracts for gas, coal, or the like
considered here. With rare exception, the contract price in a long-term
contract will be variable: It may have a fixed escalator (8 percent per
year), or it may be at a fixed premium over a spot price (spot price
plus 5 percent), but more likely the contract price will vary in
accordance with an index such as the CPI or the GDP.
The contract quantity in a remote year will be as uncertain as the
contract price; in a gas contract it may be a function of both the seller's
ability to deliver from a particular gas reservoir and the buyer's needs.
The quantity may have a ceiling, a floor or both.
Finally, any calculation of damages on a long-term contract requires
discounting to present value. One dollar of damages to be suffered
twenty years hence can be satisfied by a much smaller sum today.
Every one of these complications-market, price, quantity, discount-introduces uncertainty into the damage calculation on breach
of a long-term contract. Drafters of the U.C.C. anticipated these issues
only dimly; the more remote in time are the events to be measured,
the more inherently uncertain is the calculation of damages.
For a clairvoyant, determining damages would be easy. Assume,
for example, that a purchaser of natural gas breaks a contract in year
one that calls for delivery of gas for twenty years. To measure the
damages precisely, one would need to know the contract price for each
of the twenty years, the appropriate market price for each of those
years, the quantity of gas to be delivered in each, and the appropriate
discount rate. Knowing each of those factors, a clairvoyant could
calculate the damages with precision and order the buyer to pay a
specific dollar amount in year one that would exactly compensate the
seller.
But the courts are not clairvoyant, and the U.C.C. gives them only
wobbly proxies for the data described in the preceding sentence.
Section 2-723 instructs a court to measure damages as of the time
when "the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation" if the case
comes to trial before the time for performance. Ignoring the considerable technical difficulties with Section 2-723 itself, understand first
how crude the proxy. Presumably the drafters are telling the court to
(Matthew Bender & Co. Inc.)
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measure the contract market difference on the date of repudiation and
then to project that differential forward for the nineteen years of the
contract. Necessarily, such a projection ignores changes in the market
and contract prices, and it gives no help in estimating the quantity.
Because it does not even mention discount, it gives no clue about the
rate to be chosen or the basis for choice.
[1]

Section 2-723.

The drafters of the 1950s probably did not contemplate contracts
for periods of twenty or thirty years, but they clearly contemplated
contracts where performance would occur after the time for trial.
Section 2-723 is designed to deal with at least one issue in such cases.
It instructs the court to base damages on the "market price" at the
date that the aggrieved party learns of the repudiation.
What of the contract price? Section 2-723 does not in terms state
that the "contract price" at the time buyer learns of the repudiation
should be the other part of the damage formula, but surely the contract
price must also be measured at the time the aggrieved party learned
of the repudiation. To choose any other price deprives the contract
market differential of its legitimacy. Damages are measured by
comparing the market price with the contract price at a particular time
and place on the ground that the aggrieved party will turn to that
market for a substitute purchase or sale. To select a contract price
remote in time from the date of repudiation is to ignore that basic
principle on which the contract market differential formula is based.
In Columbia Gas, 32 certain gas producers acknowledged that
Section 2-723 set the time to measure the market price but argued
for use of the (escalated) contract price at the time of trial more than
two years after the repudiation. Gas had been deregulated after
repudiation but before trial; on deregulation some contract prices
doubled and even quadrupled. By comparing a 1993 contract price
with a 1991 market price these sellers would have greatly magnified
their damages. To split the dates at which one measures the market
price and contract price in the same formula makes no sense; it
magnifies any distortions that otherwise occur in the contract market
differential because it allows one (contract) to escalate while the other
(market) is held steady. That is exactly what would have happened
32 Jn re Columbia Gas System, Inc., N. 28 supra., No. 91-803, No. 91-804 (Bankr. D. Del.
1991).
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc)
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in the Columbia Gas case if certain sellers had had their way. The
market price (about $1.20 at time of repudiation) would have been
held steady, whereas the contract price (between $2 and $3 at time
of repudiation) would have jumped as much as $4 or $5. In that same
time, the spot market had itself doubled.
In the author's opinion Section 2-723 must be read to measure both
the contract and the market price at the time the aggrieved party
learned of the repudiation. The author suspects that Section 2-723 does
not mention contract price because the drafters in the 1940s were
dealing with contracts that had fixed prices, not with today's long-term
contracts with variable contract prices.
Section 2-723 poses a second difficulty. Quite clearly, one is to
measure the market (and, the author would add, the contract price)
as of the date of repudiation for periods after the trial, but what about
the contract/market differential for the period after repudiation but
before the trial? The plain language of Section 2-723(1) is that "any
damages"-apparently including those in that gap period-are to be
measured at the time the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.
But why ignore the actual and known market and contract prices that
prevailed before trial?
If the language of Section 2-723 were slightly twisted, parties would
be allowed to use the actual market and contract prices to measure
damages in the gap between repudiation and trial. With crowded
dockets and the extensive discovery that is commonly practiced in
large commercial law suits, trial might not occur for five years or
longer after the repudiation. When so, the damages for the intervening
time may be a substantial portion of the plaintiff's recovery, and there
is no apparent reason to ignore these data. Of course, choosing the
actual contract and market prices in the interim period produces the
irony that damages later in time (after trial) are measured by an earlier
market (time of repudiation) than is used to measure damages suffered
earlier (before trial).
Whether one chooses the time of repudiation, the time of trial, or
some other time to measure damages, there is always the possibility
that one or both parties may engage in strategic behavior to minimize
damages or to maximize recovery. For example, it would be in the
interest of a purchaser of natural gas to repudiate its contract shortly
before decontrol if the contract price then prevailing is lower than the
likely price would be after decontrol. Conversely, if prices were likely
(Mauhcw Bender & Cu., Inc.)
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to fall after decontrol, the buyer might wait until after decontrol to
repudiate. If damages are measured at the time of trial, one party has
an incentive to put off trial-to make additional motions and take
additional discovery in the hope that passage of time will reduce or
increase its damage claim. There is no obvious way to stymie strategic
behavior completely in breaches of long-term contracts. It is hoped
that the courts will be alert to this possibility and will respond to
appropriate pleas by the other party in circumstances where one is
engaging in strategic activity.

[2]

What Market?

Should one use a spot market, a long-term market, or some variation
to find market price when a long-term contract is breached? In
Manchester Pipeline 33 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
remanded a suit for breach of a long-term gas contract with instructions
that the proper market was not the spot market but instead the market
for long-term gas. Initially, the author was persuaded by that case and
requested that it be cited in the Article 2 Study Group Report. On
reflection, it seems that the Tenth Circuit is sending the trial court
on a goose chase. In the case of twenty-year contracts for the sale
of commodities such as gas, coal or oil, there is unlikely ever to be
a "long-term market" that can be used as a reliable damage reference.
Any long-term market will not be at a fixed price posted daily on a
commodities exchange; it will be at a variable price tied to unknowable
events. Assuming that such contracts signed at or near the time of
repudiation were available to the parties (and ignoring that the price
terms in those contracts may not be public knowledge), they would
not give any better basis for establishing a market than the spot market.
Even when there are forward contracts, those contracts will be for one
year or less, and they will be no better than the spot price. Although
the author believes the court should look to the most comparable
market available, it seems unlikely that there will ever be a long-term
market that will be suitable for use in establishing the market in the
Section 2-723 formula.
Still, one could do slightly better than spot price in these circumstances. The spot price for certain commodities (such as natural gas)
may rise and fall systematically during the year because of seasonal
33 Manchester Pipeline Corp. v Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439, 7 U.C.C. Rep
Serv.2d JOO), 108 0. & G.R. 497 (10th Cir. 1988).
(Mauhcw Bender & Cu .. Inc)
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factors. It does not offend the language of Section 2-723 to use a
"smoothed" spot price that is deseasonalized. Nor does Section 2-723
rule out the averaging of several months of spot prices or the like.
The author believes that a court should be willing to hear arguments
for modified spot prices, and when it seems sensible to do so, adopt
those prices. Yet one should not feel too sorry for a seller who is stuck
with a low spot price or buyer who is stuck with a high one. In many
cases, the breaching party will have chosen the date of repudiation.
Moreover, Section 2-723 also sticks the seller with its contract price
at that "spot" and so deprives the seller of escalation terms that might
outrun increases in the spot price.

[3]

Volume.

With no exceptions to the author's knowledge, long-term contracts
for the sale of commodities such as oil, gas, coal, and nuclear fuel
do not have fixed quantities for remote time periods. In the natural
gas industry, it would be common to limit the seller's obligation to
some percentage of the amount "deliverable." The amount that would
be deliverable would be a function of the pressure in the field and
of other operating circumstances that might influence that amount.
These contracts are also likely to have restrictions on the buyer's duty
to take. Examples are the infamous take-or-pay clauses. The contract
might have a ceiling and a floor, and such a contract might have a
variety of "outs" for buyers who experience a decline in their need
for a particular commodity. Where there are minimum quantities, those
amounts can provide a floor on the quantities to be delivered. Because
every one of these potential fluctuations compounds the plaintiff's
proof problem, a court should be generous in listening to an aggrieved
party's expert testimony about projections.

[4]

The Discount Rate.

Although Article 2 nowhere discusses discounting future damages
to present value, its modem sister, Article 2A, does contemplate
discounting. 34 Despite the silence of Article 2, damages for future
failure to perform must be discounted. As early as 1916, the Supreme
Court recognized the need to discount damages awarded for future
3 4 Article 2A of the Code, recognizing that leases by their nature are long-term contracts,
uses formulas similar to those in Article 2, but specifically requires courts to discount to present
value. See U.C.C. § 2A-518, § 2A-SJ9, § 2A-527, § 2A-528, § 2A-529.
(Mallhew Bender & Co .• Inc.)

§ 9.05[4]

OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION

9-30

benefits to present value. In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v.
Kel/y3s the Court noted:
So far as a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits,
it will afford more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits without taking account of the earning power of the
money that is presently to be awarded. It is self-evident that a given
sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of money
payable in the future. * * * [A]s a rule, and in all cases where it
is reasonable to suppose that interest may safely be earned upon
the amount that is awarded, the ascertained future benefits ought
to be discounted in the making up of the award. * * * [T]he verdict
should be made up on the basis of their present value only. 36
Today, the Court's statement is a platitude. In even the simplest
personal injury case, it is now commonplace to discount damages to
present value. The hard part is not to understand that damages for
future losses should be discounted but to determine the rate of
discount.
The following formula is the one commonly given for calculating
present value:
X
(1 + d)N

Where X equals the amount of money to be discounted, d is the
discount rate, and N equals the number of years hence when the money
is to be available. Thus, if one were to discount $1,000 at 10 percent
for one year, the formula would read as follows:

1000
(1 +.1)1

= 909

If one were to discount $1,000 at 10 percent for two years, it would
be:
1000
(1 +.1) 2

=

826

One should note some assumptions about the formula used here and
about the formula that would normally be used in the calculation of
long-term damages on a sales contract. It is assumed that X is fixed.
35 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
36 Id. at 489-490.
(Matthew Bender & Co .. Inc )
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It is found by use of Section 2-723 or by some other means. In that
respect, this formula is not like the formulae that are sometimes used
in calculating personal injury recoveries of lost wages where the
numerator of the fraction (X) is itself increased with time to reflect
inflation even as the denominator is used to reduce the amount because
of its discount to present value. Here it is assumed that the dollar figure
to be paid is known; the formula takes no account of any changes
that should be made in that number because of change in markets,
contract prices, or any other factors.
Of course, present value is inversely related to the magnitude of
the discount rate. For example, $1,000 payable two years hence has
a present value of $961 if the discount rate is 2 percent but only $826
discounted at 10 percent.
Also obvious is the fact that the more remote the payment, the
greater the impact of the discount rate. Thus the difference between
a 2 percent and a 10 percent discount over only two years is $135
on $1,000 ($961 minus $826), but that difference grows to $434 for
a payment due ten years from the time of calculation. Assume a case
in which a defendant owes the plaintiff $1 million for each of seven
years. The present value of those damages at a 6 percent discount is
$5,582,000; their present value at a 10 percent discount rate is almost
$1 million less-$4,868,000. As the dollar amounts grow and the
prospective time of payment becomes more remote, discount rates
have a growing importance, merit careful examination, and can
engender bitter argument.
Although there is wide agreement about the need to discount, there
is not wide agreement about the theory or the principle that should
guide one in selecting the proper discount rate. 37 One possibility is
to pick a "risk free" rate. 38 This would be a rate such as that earned
on U.S. Treasury Bonds. Using such a small d~scount rate is likely
to overcompensate every plaintiff except those who are quite risk
averse (and who would therefore invest any damages at a low and
safe rate). Sometimes these rates have been used with personal injury
37 Some states have statutory discount rates, e.g., Pennsylvania. Another possibility that comes
to mind is to use the aggrieved party's expected after-tax profit margin. This presumably equals
what the entity earns by using the funds available to it. However, as a matter of (aimess, the
breaching party perhaps should not be saddled with the success (or lack thereof) with which
the aggrieved party runs its business.
38 Various economists in the claim estimation proceedings in the Columbia Gas Transmission
Co. bankruptcy suggested discount rates that ranged from 6 to 30 percent.
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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plaintiffs on the assumption that they would be risk averse and quite
conservative. Sometimes such rates are also justified for use in the
denominator on the ground that other risks are incorporated in the
numerator (X) of the present value fraction.
With a typical business plaintiff, the author does not believe that
the risk-free rate is appropriate. It seems that such a rate would almost
always overstate a risk-neutral plaintiff's damages by failing to
discount them adequately.
A second possibility is to use the borrowing rate of the defendant
as the discount rate. This treats the damage transaction as though the
aggrieved party were borrowing money from the defendant. Of course,
in a sense, that is what a long-term contract is-a promise of distant
performance by each party to the other. Whether or not the defendant
would be technically regarded as a debtor of the plaintiff in such a
contract, in effect each is both a debtor and a creditor in a long-term
bilateral deal. Arguably, therefore, the long-term contract is analogous
to a loan by the plaintiff to the defendant and should take account
of the probability that the defendant might not perform. Arguably this
is the "bargained for" risk, and it can be estimated by looking at the
price (interest rate) that a bank would require to loan money to an
entity with a similar type of business and a similar credit rating to
the breaching party. The defendant's credit rating, of course, should
be determined at the time the contract was entered into, not at the
time of breach, and then it should be carried forward to estimate the
cost of borrowing.
The consequence of such a choice would be a large discount (and
therefore comparatively smaller damages) if the defendant had a
comparatively low credit rating, but a small discount (and therefore
comparatively large damages) if the defendant were a blue-chip
company. In any event, the legitimacy of raising and lowering the
present value based on the credit-worthiness of the defendant seems
doubtful here.
A third way of setting the discount rate is to try to estimate the
return that persons in the shoes of the aggrieved party, the plaintiff,
would earn on money given to it at the time of judgment. If this amount
could be precisely estimated, it would give the plaintiff exactly the
amount of money in years two and three and later years as that
calculated as the appropriate amount in the numerator. Thus, if one
knew for certain that the plaintiff would earn a 10 percent return
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc.)
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compounded, then a 10 percent discount rate would be the appropriate
rate.
Of course, there are complications here too. One must make
assumptions about a plaintiff's probable behavior. A good guess is
to assume that the plaintiff will invest in its own business. Having
assumed an investment in the business, one needs to calculate the rate
of return in the business or its cost of capital. Calculating the cost
of capital itself requires some art, for one would need to consider the
cost of borrowing together with the cost of equity. Those two would
have to be weighted in accordance with the debt-equity ratio at the
time of breach. Moreover, economists will differ on how to calculate
the cost of equity. One way to do it would be to use a capital asset
pricing model under which a risk-free rate is added to a risk premium
that is calculated on the basis of a financial "beta." The financial beta
is a sensitivity index that measures the volatility of a stock relative
to the stock market as a whole. Therefore, even if one accepts the
suggestion that one should look at the plaintiff and not at the defendant
and should attempt to estimate the return that the plaintiff will make
on the money given it at judgment, finding that return and calculating
it even with relative precision will be a hard task.
Use of the particular behavior of a plaintiff or of the plaintiff's return
on equity has an ironic consequence similar to the one described above
with respect to the credit-worthiness of the defendant. If the plaintiff
is a particularly efficient company or is engaged in an industry where
the return on capital is relatively high, it will be punished for that
efficiency because the high rate of return produces a high discount
rate and gives correspondingly lower damages.
It may be questioned whether the lucky and efficient should be so
penalized. Perhaps one should not look just at the return on equity
of the particular plaintiff or of a particular industry but rather at the
return investors in such businesses generally expect.
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